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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, trade and commerce between the United States and China
has increased enormously. Ideally, in most cases trade and commerce leads to friendly
relations. However, it must be recognized that disputes can arise when parties are
disappointed about any given transaction. One dispute resolution method that has led to a
large degree of acceptance is international commercial arbitration.
Arbitration is different from litigation in that it is based on party autonomy. The
parties have the right to select arbitrators, tailor arbitration procedures, and choose the
law governing their disputes. 1 However, arbitration is not a closed legal system. In fact,
an effective international arbitration system is based on vigorous enforcement of
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards by national courts. Accordingly, when national
courts are called on to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, it is inevitable
that the enforcement will be subject to judicial review. Thus, although arbitration is
known as a private dispute resolution mechanism, it is not totally out of the control of
national courts. Usually, national courts will interfere with the international commercial
arbitration in three different ways. First, a party may bring a suit in a court in spite of an
existing arbitration agreement. Then the court may be called upon by the other party to
enforce the arbitration agreement. Second, a party who prevailed in the previous
arbitration proceeding may ask a national court to enforce the arbitral award against the
losing party. Third, a party who dissatisfied with an arbitral award may ask the competent
court of the country where the arbitration took place to set aside the award. In the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement, judicial review only concerns the validity of the
agreement itself, including whether the subject matter can be arbitrated and whether the
parties lack capacity to enter into the agreement. However, in the enforcement of an
arbitral award, the scope of judicial review is much broader. It may include not only the
validity of the arbitration agreement, but also the arbitration procedure and the contents
of the award.
2
Lack of uniform standards of judicial review will be detrimental to the development
and expansion of international commercial arbitration. If different countries adopt
different standards in reviewing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, the parties
will face questions such as whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable and whether
an arbitral award could be enforced in a particular country even if they eventually prevail
in the arbitration. Moreover, if national courts adopt very stringent standards in reviewing
commercial arbitration, the parties may be reluctant to choose arbitration as a means of
alternative dispute resolution. Thus the need for predictability in international commerce
calls for unifying national standards in reviewing international arbitration. The United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was
the first broadly accepted international agreement. The agreement aims to consolidate
international arbitration at the global level.
3 Under the New York Convention, refusal of
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is only permitted in limited circumstances.
However, the New York Convention contains a public policy defense in Article V Section
2(b). Since national interpretations of public policy may differ greatly, that Section may
frustrate the purpose of the Convention. One commentator noted that "the effectiveness
of international commercial arbitration depends on the predictable enforcement of arbitral
1 See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, at 742 (4th ed. 1994).
See Javier Garcia De Enterria, The Role ofPublic Policy in International Commercial Arbitration, LAW
& POL' Y INT' L BUS 389, 395 (1990).
3
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at
New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, 330 U. N. T. S. 38(hereinafter, "New York
Convention")
agreements and awards." In fact, public policy defense has been deemed as a loophole in
the New York Convention. 5
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how public policy defense functions in
international commercial arbitration and whether it will block the development of
international commercial arbitration.
Chapter II deals with the role of public policy in international private law. This
Chapter examines the origins of public policy in common law countries and its functions
in international private law. It is difficult to evaluate public policy as a precise concept
because of its relative nature. Nevertheless, to limit its application in international private
law, legal scholars have tried to clarify differences between domestic public policy,
international public policy and transnational public policy.
Chapter III discusses the legal history of the New York Convention and analyzes the
role of the public policy exception under the Convention.
Chapter IV gives an overview of the judicial application of the public policy
exception in the United States. The case law shows that American courts narrowly read
public policy defense in determining the arbitrability of subject matters, the propriety of
arbitration procedures and the content of arbitration awards. This Chapter also analyzes
why American courts adhere to a narrow construction of public policy defense.
Chapter V examines how Chinese courts apply the public policy exception in
practice. It seems that Chinese courts broadly, sometimes even incorrectly, invoke the
public policy exception to refuse enforcement of arbitration agreements or arbitral awards
though enacted laws indicate a narrow construction.
Chapter VI discusses the role of the public policy exception in the future. It seems
unlikely that the public policy exception will be removed from international arbitration
See Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration under U. S. Law and AAA Rules, Disp. Resol. J., Jan.
1995, at 25.
5 See Enterria, supra note 2, at 391
.
any time soon. However, the tendency of narrowly reading the public policy exception
has created the basis for development of the notion of a transnational public policy, a
policy that would facilitate predictability in international commercial arbitration.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Origins of Public Policy and Its Functions in International Private Law
The concept of public policy was recognized in English law as early as the fifteenth
century.
6
It first developed from the area of conflict of laws. The emergence of conflict
rules is attributed to thriving international transactions. When confronted with a dispute
involving foreign facts, the judge first had to determine which law governed. During the
past centuries, every nation in the world developed its conflict rules to determine the
applicable law in foreign-related cases.
7
However, if the forum court found that the
foreign law created an obligation pernicious to local morality and social order, the court
could reject application of foreign law, even if it should have been applied according to
the forum court's own conflict rules. Obviously, the underlying reason for the
development of public policy is that "no country can afford to open its tribunals to the
legislature of the world without reserving for its judges the power to reject foreign law
that is harmful to the forum."8 In practice, courts generally are reluctant to decide cases
upon public policy grounds because of its ambiguity and vagueness in its meaning. Judge
Burrough pointed out that "public policy was a very unruly horse and you never know
where it will carry you once you get astride it."9 The concept of ordre public in civil law
countries is analogous to public policy, and operates to exclude application of foreign law
6
See Knight, Public Policy in English Law, 38 L. Q. Rev. 207 (1922).
Story, an American legal scholar, viewed comity as the compelling forces behind the development of
conflict rules. He thought that public policy exception was vestigal to his comity idea and it will decline in
importance when nations grew jurisprudentially together. On the contrary, Savigny, a German jurist,
believed that the compelling forces behind the development of conflict rules were not comity, but the need
of international business and commerce. However, both of them agreed that in practice the application of
public policy should be vigorously discouraged.
See Bodenheimer, The Public Policy Exception in Private International Law: A Reappraisal in the Light
ofLegal Philosophy, 12 SEMINAR 51, 64(1954).
in certain circumstances. However, the scope of ordre public is much broader than public
policy. It includes any domestic legal provisions that are mandatory in nature and can not
be excluded by private agreement. 10
The primary role of public policy and ordre public in international private law is to
negate the effect of foreign legislation or judicial judgement. The initial function of
public policy is to empower the court of forum to reject foreign laws repugnant to the
forum's sense of morality and decency. Traditionally, it has been held that agreements for
prostitution,
1
purchase of a slave, 12 and incestuous marriage 13 are voidable for violation
of basic moral standards generally accepted by human beings. Nonetheless, national
courts rarely reject foreign laws only on the ground of moral repugnancy because
standards of morality change over time. Moreover, courts are very cautious to declare the
foreign law as uncivilized and inhumane. 14
A second function of public policy is to prevent injustice in extreme circumstances.
The court rejects foreign law not for its moral repugnancy, but the harsh result of
application of foreign law in a particular case. This is known as "residual discretion" in
common law countries, and it is employed to avoid an unjust or unconscionable result in
certain circumstances. " However, "residual discretion" is not a generally accepted
principle in private international law. "Residual discretion" is triggered only when
application of foreign law will cause a particular hardship in the case. 16
9
See Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (Ex. 1824).
10
See Husserl, Public Policy and Order Public, 25 VA. L. Rev. 37, 38 (1938).
11
See Robinson v. Bland, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 725 (K. B. 1760).
12
See Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K. B. 1772); Cf. Santos v. Illidge, 141 Eng. Rep. 1404 (C. P.
1860) (contract for sale of slaves held not illegal).
13
See Cheni v. Cheni (1963) 2 W. L. R. 17.
See Murphy, The Traditional View ofPublic Policy and Order Public in Private International Law, 1
1
GA, J. INT' L & COMP, L. 591 (1981).
15
See V. DICEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLIC OF LAWS, at 74 (9 th ed. 1973). See also Qureshi v. Qureshi
(1972) Fam. 173, 199: "The Court already has adequate power to refuse to recognize the legal rule of the
domicile where it would cause injustice in a particular case." (Opinion of Sir J. Simon).
16
See Nygh, Foreign Status, Public Policy and Discretion, 13 I. C. L. Q. 39, 49 (1964).
A third function of public policy is that it empowers the court to apply its own law
when there is a strong relationship between forum and transaction. 17 This application
might occur when, for example, an American company enters into a contract to sell goods
to an enemy country of America. When the case was submitted to the American court,
the court might reject foreign law even if it should be applied under American conflict
rules. The rationale would be that American public policy bars the application of foreign
law in the situation.
B. Relativity of the Concept of Public Policy
Because of its vagueness and ambiguity in meaning, the possibility of abusing public
policy in practice has long been recognized by the judiciary. National judges may make
arbitrary decisions under the guise of public policy. It has been said that "the principal
1 S
vice of the public policy concepts is that they provide a substitute for analysis." Legal
scholars and practitioners have tried to give public policy a precise definition to avoid
any arbitrary use. However, public policy has been called "one of the most elusive and
divergent notions in the world of juridical science." 19 It is very difficult to give public
policy an objective definition because its contents concern both the matters of place and
time.
20
17
See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict ofLaws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1016 (1956).
(In the United States, Professor Brainerd Currie proposed a theory, which was known as "government
interest analysis". Under interest analysis, the court should not blindly defer to the conflict rules of forum
when deciding on the choice of law issues. On the contrary, the court should identify all competing interest
in the case. If a competing interest is determined by the forum court to be expressed by the foreign law, the
forum court must apply the foreign law only when the forum has no interest in the application of its own
policy).
18 Mat 1017.
19
See Horsmans, L ' arbitrage et ' Order Public Interne Beige, 2 Rev. Arb.79, 80 ( 1 978). Conflict of laws
scholars have offered various definitions of public policy, such as: "legal precepts which evidently and
principally serve to guarantee in the state the political, economical, and moral order established by
the... sovereign" and "the principles upon which is based the political organization of a civil society..." See
also Havicht, The Application ofSoviet Laws and the Expectation ofPublic order, 21 AM. J. INT" L L.
238, 244 (1927). However, all these definitions are subjective.
20
See Bockstiegel, Public Policy and Arbitrability, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION: PRACTICE
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 177, 181 (P. Sanders ed. 1987).
8First, public policy is a national phenomenon. Every country has its own economical
system, social structure and tradition, and has therefore developed a different legal
system. For example, national legal systems of most countries have been generally
divided into two categories: civil law countries and common law countries. They share
different legal traditions. Even in civil law countries or common law countries, national
legal system may differ from each other. An action, which may be deemed as violative
the public policy of one country, may not be seen as violating the public policy of another
country. However, in a certain regional community that shares common value and
standards, there may develop a similar public policy.
Second, public policy is a matter of time/ 1 Marx pointed out that a national legal
system always reflects morality, economics, legal tradition and politics of certain
country. So, when a country modifies its morality, economy or other social aspects, the
legal system in turn evolves. It not surprising that in a certain country an action, which
may previously be deemed as violative of public policy, may now be acceptable.
Because of the relativity of public policy, many legal scholars have noticed the
difficulty of defining public policy. 23 It is now generally accepted that public policy is a
judicially administered principle defined by the use courts find for it. 24
C. Differences between Domestic Public Policy, International Public Policy and
Transnational Public Policy
Concerning international commercial arbitration, some legal scholars have
distinguished the concepts of domestic public policy, international public policy and
transnational public policy 25 The differences between these concepts are very important
See Enterria, supra note 2.
" See MARX, 2 FLORILEGIUM OF MARX
,
at 176 (2th, 1989).
23
See D. LLOUD, PUBLIC POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW
24-26(1953).
See Husserl, supra note 10. See also Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale L. J. 1087, 1091-92 (1956).
See Jay R. Sever, The Relaxation ofInarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U. S. and Foreign
in arbitration practice. By introducing the concepts of international public policy and
transnational public policy, legal scholars and practitioners try to limit the role of public
policy in international commercial arbitration.
Domestic public policy refers to mandatory legal provisions expressed by legislative
enactment, constitutional constraints, or judicial practice within individual states. These
legal provisions can not be contracted around by private parties. When public policy is
applied to arbitration, national courts may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements or
arbitral awards violative of the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice. 26
Compared with domestic public policy, international public policy is a narrower
concept. It only refers to laws and standards by which individual states govern
international commercial arbitration. That means only part of domestic public policy
consists of international public policy. So, what might be considered against public policy
in domestic arbitration may not block the enforcement of arbitration agreements or
arbitral award in international commercial arbitration. In France, Article 1498 of the
French Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile refers specifically to international public
policy, and provides that foreign arbitral awards be unenforceable only when they are
contrary to international public policy in France.
7 Emergence of international public
policy arises from "the special features of international cases and the problems with
• • 9 8
mechanical application of domestic order public rules to international situations."" The
more liberal international public policy would foster coherence and predictability in
international commerce.
29
Arbitration: Arbitration out of Control, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1661, 1663. See also Enterria, supra note 2.
26
See Parsons & Whitmore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L' Industrie du Papier, 508 F. 2d 969, 974
(2dCir. 1974).
27
See CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVIL [C. PR. CIV] § 1498 (1986).
28
See Enterria, supra note 2, at 401.
See Kenneth-Michael Curtin, Redefining Public Policy in International Arbitration ofMandatory
National Laws, 64 Def. Couns. J. 271, 280 (International public policy has been defined as a type of
balancing of interest test. National courts should consider not only its own domestic public policy, but also
the public policy of interested nations and the needs of international commerce. The rules of any one state
10
Another analogous concept is transnational public policy. Transnational public policy
refers to those universally accepted standards and values. 30 Applying transnational public
policy to international arbitration, the reviewing court should look to fundamental general
principles of law to decide whether arbitration agreements or arbitral award are
enforceable. Although the content of transnational public policy may be derived from
international public policy of individual nations, it does not belong to national legal
systems.
31
In this way, transnational public policy differs from both domestic public
policy and international public policy. Some legal scholars have noted that "transnational
public policy further removes the public policy umbrella from purely domestic policy
considerations than does international public policy." J However, application of
international public policy has caused debates in arbitration circles. If there really exists a
transnational public policy, then what is the exact content? How could it bind national
courts in reviewing arbitration agreements or arbitral awards? Should there be a
multilateral treaty to fix the content of transnational public policy and to impose upon
signatory countries an international obligation to defer to such transnational public
policy? Should transnational public policy be only part of customary international law?
There are still many questions needing answers before the concept of transnational public
policy is generally accepted.
D. Public Policy in Enforcement of Foreign Judgement
Public policy has also been broadly invoked as a defense against recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, the forum courts can use public policy to vacate
a foreign judgment rendered by an alien court. In this situation, the court utilizes public
policy to avoid negative consequences arising from the enforcement of foreign
should prevail only if warranted by the nature of the dispute and the legislative policy).
30
See Sever, supra 25, at 1663.
See Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 310 (P.
Sanders ed. 1987) (summarizing some general principles of the content of transnational public policy).
11
judgments. 33 Because national courts are more likely to apply stringent public policy in
enforcement of foreign judgments, the parties seeking enforcement of such judgments
before national courts may encounter more obstacles than those seeking enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. For example, American courts may refuse recognition of a
foreign judgment on public policy grounds if recognition "injures the public health, the
public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of law, or. .
.undermines that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of
private property, which any citizen ought to feel." In China, the requirement is even
more stringent. The enforcement should be granted only if the foreign judgment does not
violate basic principles of Chinese law, sovereignty, national security and public
interest.
5
In practice, public policy has been used by American courts as "a catch-all,
covering cases of lack ofjurisdiction, inadequate notice, and fraud, among others." 3
Moreover, the United States is not a party to any international judgment convention,
so enforcement is a matter of comity and follows the procedures of state law. The foreign
judgement will not be given conclusive effect in the United States if the court finds that
the foreign judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the state where enforcement is
sought.
37
American courts may consider public policy of individual states when they are
asked to enforce a foreign judgment. However, the public policy exception has been
narrowly applied by American courts to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Since
32 See Curtin, supra note 29, at 282.
See Cf. Von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgements-General Theory and the Role
ofJurisdictional Requirements, in 167 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAUGE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1980, II, at 47 (1981) (stating that "a society is not
prepared to make its legal machinery available where the consequences would deeply offend its views of
justice and morality").
34
See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 169 (E. D. Pa, 1970).
35
See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONGFA (The Code of Civil Procedure)
(Adopted at the 4th Session of the Standing Committee of the 7th National People' s Congress of the
People' s Republic of China, and promulgated by the President on April 9, 1991), Article 268.
36
See Enterria, supra note 2, at 401
.
See James H. Carter, A- 1 Litigating in Foreign Territory: Arbitration Alternatives and Enforcement
Issues, N98DBWB ABA-LGLED A-l, A-24.
12
arbitration is based on the parties' agreement, the parties must bear the risk and normally
are estopped from opposing the recognition or enforcement of the resulting award on
public policy or other grounds."
Recent cases decided by American courts indicate a deviation from stringent
adherence to the public policy exception in enforcement of foreign judgments. In
International Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden, 39 a case involving enforcement of a
foreign judgment based on gambling debt permitted by applicable foreign law, the court
held that a foreign judgment based on gambling debts was not contrary to New York's
public policy even though gambling contracts were illegal and therefore unenforceable
under New York law. The court further reasoned that "legalization of betting and the
operation of bingo games, as well as a strong movement for legalized off-track betting,
indicate that New York public does not consider authorized gambling a violation of some
deep-rooted tradition of the commonwealth."40 In another American case, Tahan v.
Hodgson,41 the court even enforced a foreign default judgement. After finding that an
Israeli court entered a default judgment based on notice requirements inconsistent with
American notice requirements, the court said that Israeli notice requirements were not "so
repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just that American public policy
requires non-enforcement of the Israeli judgment."42 Moreover, other cases indicate that
American courts may enforce foreign judgments awarding loss of goodwill and attorney's
fees, court costs,
4
and prejudgment interest,45 which are generally prohibited by
American law.
See Von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign-Country Judgements in the
United States, 6 Law & POL' Y INT' L BUS. 37, 61 (1974).
39
See 203 N. E. 2d 210 (N. Y. 1964).
40 Mat 213.
41
See 662 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1981).
42
Id, at 866.
43
See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F. 2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971) (the court upheld
a $94000 British judgement against a U.S. defendant consisting partly of loss of goodwill and attorney' s
fees).
13
A general study of the public policy exception to the enforcement of foreign
judgments in a particular country is helpful for understanding how public policy
functions in that country's arbitration system. Public policy is such an amorphous concept
that its content depends on national courts' judicial interpretation. Although the scope of
public policy in the enforcement of foreign judgments may be different from that in the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, national courts should not impose a more
stringent requirement in reviewing foreign arbitral awards than in reviewing foreign
judgments. A national court, which narrowly interprets public policy exceptions in the
enforcement of foreign judgments, seems unlikely to broadly invoke such exceptions in
the context of international arbitration.
44 See Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. 1992) (the Massachusetts Supreme
Court enforced a Canadian judgement awarding court costs).
45
See Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Grangei
judgement that included prejudgment interest).
r, 833 F.2d 680 (7
th
Cir. 1987) (the court enforced a Belgian
CHAPTER III
PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE IN THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
A. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and Geneva Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards
Before the enactment of the New York Convention, there were two important
multilateral treaties dealing with international commercial arbitration: the Geneva
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (Geneva Protocol) and the Geneva Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva Convention).
The Geneva Protocol was the first step adopted by international society in seeking
for consolidation of international commercial arbitration at the global level. Its primary
purpose is to facilitate universal recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements
and arbitral awards in signatory countries. Except for establishing the basic principle of
party autonomy, Article I of Geneva Protocol provides that each of the contracting states
should recognize the validity of an arbitration agreement to the extent that the subject
matter can be arbitrated under its law. 47 Concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards,
Geneva Protocol only requires the signatory country to enforce the arbitral awards made
in its territory, and there is no provision dealing with whether each signatory country has
the obligation to enforce arbitral awards rendered in other countries. 48 Since arbitrations
don't usually take place in the country where the party is seeking enforcement, most
foreign arbitral awards can not be enforced under the arrangement of the Geneva
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, League of Nations, Geneva, 1923, signed at Geneva, 24 September
1923, 27 L.N.T.S.157. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, League of Nations,
Geneva, 1927, signed at Geneva, 26 September 1927, 92 L.N.T.S.301.
47
See Article I, Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, 27 L.N.T.S.157.
Id. Article III (providing that the contracting states undertake only to "ensure the execution by its own
authorities and in accordance with the provisions of its own national laws of arbitral awards made in its
own territory under the preceding articles.").
14
15
Protocol. Moreover, the Geneva Protocol only provides that the enforcement must be in
accordance with provisions of national law of the enforcement country. The Protocol fails
to specify what the proper standards ofjudicial review are when national courts are called
on to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
These problems have been partly resolved in the Geneva Convention which was
promulgated as a supplement to the Geneva Protocol. The Geneva Convention
specifically provides that an arbitral award covered by the Geneva Protocol shall be
recognized as binding and shall be enforced if such award has been made in any
contracting state. Thus, the enforcement obligation is not limited to arbitral awards
made within the territory of the enforcing country. Other provisions of the Geneva
Convention mainly deal with circumstances under which a foreign arbitral award could
be enforced.
In the modern view, the standards of judicial review set by the Geneva Convention
are quite stringent. Some provisions are especially disadvantageous to the party who
seeks enforcement of an arbitral award. First, several conditions must be satisfied before
an arbitral award can be enforced. Those conditions include: (1) the arbitration agreement
is valid under the applicable law; (2) the subject matter is arbitrable under the law of
enforcing states; (3) the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is in accordance with the
parties' agreement and the law governing the arbitration procedure; (4) the award has
become final in the country where it has been made; (5) the recognition or enforcement
of the award is not contrary to the public policy or to the principles of law of the
enforcing state." Second, even if the above mentioned conditions have been satisfied,
national courts shall refuse to enforce an arbitral award if it is found that the award has
been set aside by the country in which it was made, the losing party was not given an
opportunity to present his case, or the arbitrators exceeded the scope of matters submitted
See Article I, Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
16
for arbitration.
51
Third, the party who seeks enforcement bears the burden of proving the
finality of the arbitral award, the validity of the arbitration agreement and proper
constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Because of those defects in both the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention, they
were not generally accepted as an instrument to enforce international arbitration
agreements and international arbitral awards. Few countries outside Europe accepted the
Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention.
B. New York Convention
After Second World War, the globalization of world economy called for uniform
standards to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards at the international level
and the liberation of international commercial arbitration from stringent control of
national courts. Eventually, the United Nations Economic and Social Council created
drafts of a multilateral convention, which aimed to encourage enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards in signatory countries and create unifying standards by
which arbitral awards can be enforced. " These drafts were recently promulgated as the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of June 1958. The New York Convention was so successful that it has been
accepted by over one hundred countries, including all major developed countries in the
world. 5 One commentator has stated that "the New York Convention can be considered
as the most important Convention in the field of arbitration and as the cornerstone of
current international commercial arbitration."54
50
Id.
51
Id. Article II.
52
See ALBERT J. VAN DEN BERG, The NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 6
(1981), at 7-8.
53 See ZHAO XIUWEN, GUOJI JINGJI MAOYI ZHONGCAI FA (International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Law) (1995), at 322.
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Compared with the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention, the provisions of the
New York Convention are more favorable to international commercial arbitration. The
New York Convention imposes upon contracting states an obligation to enforce arbitral
awards made in any other signatory country. 35 It also reduces and simplifies the
procedure and requirements for the party seeking recognition and enforcement of an
award. 56 However, the most important achievement of the New York Convention is its
pro-enforcement philosophy. The party who challenges the arbitral award should bear the
burden of proving the existence of refusal grounds contained in Article V of the New
York Convention.
Article V of the New York Convention provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made; or
(b) The parties against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made.
See New York Convention, supra note 3, Article I,
Id, Article IV,
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2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
Like the Geneva Convention, the New York Convention also expressly recognizes
public policy as a defense against recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.
Since the New York Convention is the most important instrument for the party who seeks
enforcement of an international arbitral award, a careful analysis of the Convention itself
will be helpful for understanding the role of public policy in international commercial
arbitration.
First, Article V(2)(b) provides that the court of the enforcing country may refuse
recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, deemed contrary to that country's public
policy. Although it only refers to the application of public policy of the country where
enforcement is sought, other provisions imply that other contracting states' public policy
may also be concerned. Article 11(3) requires the court of the contracting state to enforce
the parties' arbitration agreement unless the court finds that the agreement is null and
void.
57 A party may institute court proceedings in his own country in spite of the
existence of an arbitration agreement, and the court may invalidate the arbitration
agreement on the ground of public policy violation and assume jurisdiction over the
dispute. Moreover, Article V(l)(e) provides that the court may refuse to enforce an
arbitral award at the request of the party if such arbitral award has been set aside in the
country where the arbitration took place." A losing party to an arbitration who intends to
avoid enforcement of the arbitral award may ask for the award to be set aside in the
country where the arbitration took place. However, the New York Convention is silent on
57
Id, Article II (3).
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what circumstances enable the national court to set aside an arbitral award, and the
procedures governing setting aside arbitral awards have been left to the legal regimes of
individual states. Nevertheless, most countries' arbitration laws permit the court to set
aside an arbitral award on the ground of public policy violation. Therefore, an
international commercial arbitration may be affected by the public policy of the country
where enforcement is sought, the country where the arbitration took place, and the
country that likely assumes jurisdiction over the dispute.
Second, since an international commercial arbitration may concern public policy of
any contracting state, the scope of the public policy exception in the New York
Convention can not be determined by reference to its text alone. 60 Moreover, different
versions of the Convention also make it difficult to interpret the public policy exception
precisely. The French text of the New York Convention uses the term "ordre public",
whereas the English text uses the term "public policy". It is generally understood that the
meaning oi^ordre public'' in civil law countries is broader than the term "public policy"
in common law countries. However, the drafters of the New York Convention desired to
limit the scope of the public policy exception as much as possible. 61 A comparison of the
same exception contained in the Geneva Convention and the New York Convention also
reveals that national courts should narrowly interpret the public policy exception. Article
1(e) of the Geneva Convention provides that an arbitral award will be enforced if "the
58
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recognition or enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public policy or to the
principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon."( However,
the New York Convention only authorizes national courts to vacate the arbitral award on
the ground of public policy. A general understanding is that the concept of "the principle
of the law of the country" is much broader than public policy. Therefore, a foreign
arbitral award, which violates principles of the law of the country where recognition or
enforcement is sought, may still remain in accordance with that country's public policy
rules. Obviously, the absence in the New York Convention of reference to the principles
of the law of the enforcing state suggests that the scope of the public policy exception in
the New York Convention is intended to be more narrow. 64 This explanation is also in
accordance with the pro-enforcement philosophy and the goal of the New York
Convention to integrate international arbitration at the global level, which would
otherwise be impeded by a broad reading of the public policy exception in the New York
Convention.
Third, Article V(l) provides five grounds under which the national court may refuse
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award upon the request of a party. 65 All
those grounds are related to arbitration procedure. Article V(2) authorizes the court of the
enforcing state to vacate an arbitral award on the ground of non-arbitrability of the
subject matter or violation of public policy even where the party does not raise such
not be given a broad scope of application").
62
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defense before the court. Article V(l) provides for some basic requirements of fairness
and justice for the international commercial arbitration that are grounded in public policy
notions. The public policy exception contained in Article V(2) has been deemed as a
residual clause under which the national court may set aside an arbitral award that is not
covered by those specified grounds in Article V(l). However, it must bear in mind that
Article V(l) and Article V(2) have different functions in the New York Convention.
Article V(l) is designed to maintain the basic justice in international commercial
arbitration and give the judicial remedy to a party who is the victim of an unjust
arbitration. The main purpose of the public policy exception in Article V(2)(b) is not only
to prevent injustice in a particular arbitration but also to maintain the basic social and
legal order in the enforcing state. For example, if a foreign arbitral award required the
losing party to take action, which would violate the United States export restriction,
American courts may refuse to enforce the award on the ground of public policy.
However, this case may not involve the issue of procedural fairness. The starting point for
the national court to invoke the public policy exception is not whether the arbitration is
an unjust one, but whether recognition or enforcement is contrary to the most basic
notions of morality and justice. 66 Since the public policy exception is designed to protect
national interests, this also explains why the New York Convention authorizes the
national court to invoke the public policy exception on its own motion. In practice,
reading public policy exception as a residual clause to Article V (1) may increase the
possibility of disguised use of the public policy exception by national courts. National
courts may refuse to enforce the awards because they merely conceive the awards as the
result of unfair arbitration, and not that recognition or enforcement will be contrary to the
basic notions of morality and justice of the enforcing state. As one commentator noted, it
See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de Tlndustrie du Papier (RAKTA), supra
note 26, at 974.
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could really do harm to international commercial arbitration if national courts try to
utilize the public policy exception to attain justice in individual arbitration cases. 6
Fourth, the use of the permissive term "may" in the English version of Article V
means that national courts have discretion to determine whether a foreign arbitral award
is enforceable even if it is contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state.
Fifth, a public policy defense was incorporated into the New York Convention as an
essential political tool to encourage reluctant member states to join the New York
Convention. Professor Behr said that in the enforcement of foreign judgments "the public
policy requirement is indispensable. Moreover, in the long run, it is sensible to preserve
an ultimate safeguard against unforeseen and unforeseeable divergences between
domestic law and the laws of different jurisdictions."68 In this aspect, public policy has
the same function, although the New York Convention concerns recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In fact, the inclusion of the public policy
exception in the New York Convention was used to quiet potential objections to
ratification of the Convention by member states.
Generally speaking, for a long time the public policy exception has been deemed as
a loophole in the New York Convention. Although the context of New Convention itself
does not provide any guidance for a national court to interpret the public policy
67
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exception, in practice it is read narrowly by most national courts. Therefore, until now the
public policy exception in the New York Convention has not become an obstacle to the
development of international commercial arbitration.
CHAPTER IV
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historic Hostility to Arbitration by American Courts
Before the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, American courts had historically
been hostile to arbitration. Arbitration agreements were generally unenforceable. The
party could withdraw from the arbitration at any time before an award was rendered. In
an 1814 case, Tobey v. County of Bristol, 7 Mr. Justice Story characterized the American
judicial perception of arbitral adjudication in negative terms:
Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party specifically
to perform an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to
discourage arbitrations, as against public policy. On the contrary, they have
and can have no just objection to these domestic forums, and will enforce,
and promptly interfere to enforce their awards when fairly and lawfully
made, without hesitation or question. But when they are asked to proceed
further and to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award shall
be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals possess
adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel
a reluctant party to submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him the
doors of the common courts of justice, provided by the government to
protect rights and to redress wrongs.
This judicial hostility of American courts was molded to a large extent by English
attitudes toward arbitration. 71 In England, arbitration was perceived as an infringement on
judicial authority. Arbitrators merely "attempted to play judge" and could not render
"cogent adjudicatory determinations." As a consequence, American courts generally
70
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distrusted arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution and were doubtful of
arbitrators' competence to decide cases.
However, unlike English courts which had traditionally engaged in merits review of
arbitral awards, American courts usually refrained from reviewing the merits of arbitral
awards, and would readily grant enforcement once arbitral awards were rendered. This
tradition has significantly influenced legislation and practice in the field of arbitration in
the United States. 73
B. Legal Regime for Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States
a. Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
During the early twentieth century, judicial hostility to arbitration was obviously out
of date in light of commercial realities in the United States. Businessmen need a speedy,
low cost and predictable arbitration system, which outweighed primary concerns about
the maintaining justice in arbitration. Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
in 1924, which "ended the era of would-be judicial hostility to arbitration in the United
States."
74
Since the FAA preempts state arbitration laws directly in conflict with the
FAA, 75 it was the first time that the United State established a national policy
encouraging arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation for dispute resolution. Section
2 of the FAA declares that arbitration agreement are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable..."
76
Moreover, the FAA established very limited grounds for judicial review
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of arbitral awards, excluding the possibility of a review of the merits. Section 10 of the
FAA specifically allows courts to reverse arbitral awards on four grounds:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators, or either or
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly execute
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
Although the FAA does not specifically address public policy violations, American
courts recognize public policy as a common law ground to vacate a domestic arbitral
award. But even in domestic arbitration, the court can not arbitrarily invoke public policy
exception. A court' s refusal to enforce an arbitral award is limited to situations where
enforcement "would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the law and legal precedents, and not
from general considerations of supposed public interests."
b. The United States Becomes a Signatory to the New York Convention
The United States was initially opposed to the New York Convention and did not sign
the Convention when it was adopted on June 10, 1958. American delegates felt that
certain provisions of the Convention were in conflict with some American domestic
laws. However, as a result of increasing support for the Convention in 1960's, American
government began to consider signing the New York Convention. Finally, the United
States became a signatory on September 30, 1970. The New York Convention is
incorporated in Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs the
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enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the United States. As the Supreme Court said of
the Convention in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 79 "the principle purpose underlying
American adoption and implementation of it [the Convention], was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."
Section 10 of the FAA partially overlaps with Article V of the New York Convention.
However, some defenses contained in Section 10 of the FAA, such as fraud, duress, and
bias on the part of the arbitrators, are not set forth in the New York Convention. The
question is whether those defenses not set forth in the New York Convention can be
implied grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Various judicial
interpretations suggest that the New York Convention trumps the FAA if there is conflict
between the two. In Yusuf Ahmed Algahanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., a case
involving enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the United States, Toys "R" Us, Inc.
who opposed enforcement argued that the award should be vacated or modified under the
FAA because it was irrational and in manifest disregard of the law and the terms of the
parties' agreement.
82 The court held that the grounds set forth in Article V were the
exclusive ones provided by the Convention and the FAA may supplement the Convention
only to the extent that they do not conflict. Thus, the party can not directly raise those
defenses to oppose enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the United States.
However, the public policy exception in the New York Convention is such an ambiguous
concept that the party opposing enforcement may raise those defenses as violations of
public policy of the United States. In fact, duress, fraud, bias on the part of the arbitrators,
79
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and manifest disregard of law have been raised by the losing parties as the general
argument that enforcement would be contrary to basic notions of morality and justice of
the United States.
C. General Consideration of the Public Policy Exception under the New York
Convention
The first American case dealing with public policy exception under the New York
Convention was Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'
Industrie du Papier (RAKTA). It was also the first case in which the United States
courts enforced a foreign arbitral award under Chapter 2 of FAA.
In that case, an American company, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc.,
entered into a contract with RAKTA to construct, start up, and manage for one year a
paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The contract included an arbitration clause. The
Agency for International Development, an American government foreign aid agency,
agreed to finance the project, supplying funds to purchase Letters of Credit in Overseas'
favor. Work proceeded as planned until the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War broke out in 1967.
By this time, the project was well advanced in construction but not yet completed.
Because of anti-American hostility and personal safety issues resulting from the United
States's support of Israel, the majority of the Overseas work crew left Egypt. About this
time, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with the United States and ordered all Americans
out of the country except for those who could qualify for a special visa. Also, the Agency
for International Development cut off its funding for the project. Overseas abandoned the
project for the time being and notified RAKTA that the postponement was excused by the
force majeure clause in their contract. RAKTA, unwilling to wait, went ahead and
completed Overseas' work and then sought damages through arbitration. The final award
was rendered in favor of RAKTA, and RAKTA sought to enforce the award in the United
84
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States. Overseas presented five different defenses, but the court denied all of them and
enforced the award.
Concerning public policy defense, Overseas based its argument on the fact that the
United States Agency for International Development had withdrawn financial support for
the project. Therefore, Overseas argued, as a loyal American citizen, it had to abandon
the project. Overseas attempted to equate the United States' national policy with the
United States' public policy. However, the court ruled that the public policy defense
could be used to deny enforcement of a foreign award "only where enforcement would
violate the most basic notions of morality and justice of the state where enforcement is
being requested."* The court said that United States' national policies such as the
international politics of the United States and its relations with Egypt could not be
equated with public policy. The United States falling out with Egypt did not involved the
most basic notions of morality and justice recognized in the United States. Refusal to
enforce on this basis would create a major loophole in the Convention' s mechanism for
enforcement. 86
Parsons is clearly the leading American case on interpretation of the public policy
defense of the New York Convention. Following Parsons, American courts generally
gave a narrow construction of the public policy exception in international commercial
arbitration.
D. Arbitrability and Public Policy
The FAA itself does not specifically address the issue of arbitrability of subject
matter. However, under Article 11(3) and Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention,
American courts may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitral awards if the
subject matter can not be arbitrated under American laws. The problems of arbitrability
supra note 26.
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have been classified into two categories: contractual inarbitrability and substantive
inarbitrability.
87
Contractual inarbitrability does not involve public policy issues and only
refers to disputes not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.
88
Substantive
inarbitrability concerns whether the "subject matter can be lawfully submitted to
arbitration." If a subject matter is deemed to be vital to public interest, it may be
excluded from arbitration by national laws. In this regard, public policy and arbitrability
overlap in arbitration practice. Substantive inarbitrability has traditionally been invoked
in public law claims. In the United States, this problem has been raised in the area of
antitrust law, securities law, patent law, ERISA claims, bankruptcy, and liquidated and
punitive damages claims. 90 The courts consider that arbitration is not a proper forum to
settle the statutory claims since the arbitration procedure is so informal, and arbitrators
may be incompetent to correctly interpret public law issues. 91 However, after signing the
New York Convention, American courts adopted a highly internationalist view of
transnational cases and were reluctant to strike down arbitration agreements or arbitral
awards on the ground of non-arbitrability of subject matter. Therefore, disputes, such as
securities and antitrust matters that may not be arbitrated under domestic law could be
submitted to arbitration in an international context,
a. Antitrust Statutes
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. McGuire & Co.,92 the court was for the
first time confronted with the question of whether an antitrust claim was arbitrable. The
case involved a license agreement that contained an arbitration clause. The licensee
brought an action for declaratory judgment of antitrust violations in certain paragraphs of
87
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the license agreement. The licensor made a motion under the FAA to stay the declaratory
judgement, pending arbitration for all issues. The court held that antitrust claims were
inappropriate for arbitration and gave three major reasons to support its holding. First, a
claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. "The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff
asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public's interest. Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands—
perhaps millions—of people and inflict staggering economic damage."9 Second,
arbitration procedure is not suitable for settling antitrust claims since "the issues in
antitrust cases are prone to be complicated, and the evidence extensive and diverse."
94
Third, it is improper for commercial arbitrators to decide these types of issues of great
public interest.
However, in Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co.,95 the court ruled that arbitration was a
proper forum to settle antitrust claims because the agreement to arbitrate was made after
the dispute arose.
96 The court reasoned that the parties already knew what they were
agreeing to arbitrate and the agreement to arbitrate in that case "may be regarded as an
agreement to arbitrate a specific existing dispute.
"
s 7
Therefore, the court limited the
holding in American Safety to future dispute clauses.
Finally, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
98
the Supreme
Court recognized that antitrust claims were arbitrable when it was called on to enforce an
international arbitration agreement. The claims arose from an agreement among Japanese,
Swiss and Puero Rican corporations to grant distribution rights to vehicles manufactured
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by Mitsubishi and bearing both Chrysler and Mitsubishi tradermarks. The agreement
contained a clause providing for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration
Association. After a dispute arose, Soler brought an antitrust claim in the United States
District Court. However, Mitsubishi and the Swiss corporation requested that the court
compel arbitration in accordance with the agreement. The Supreme Court held that
antitrust claims were arbitrable. The court concluded that "concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes required that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.'" Mitsubishi has been deemed a
landmark decision in the development of international commercial arbitration in the
United States. Because of the decision in Mitsubishi, non-arbitrability of antitrust claims
is no longer an available defense for the parties who intend to block enforcement of an
international arbitration agreement or a foreign arbitral award.
b. Securities Acts
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan declared that the claims brought under
the Securities Act of 1933 were nonarbitrable. 100 First, the court construed that the
Securities Act prohibited waiver of a judicial remedy in favor of arbitration by agreement
made before any controversy arose. 101 Further the court reasoned that arbitration was not
suitable for settling securities issues because of the informal arbitration procedure and the
absence of effective judicial review of arbitration.
However, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
103
the Supreme Court held that securities
issues were arbitrable. Alberto-Culver Co. was an American company. In order to expand
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its overseas operations, the company decided to purchase from Fritz Scherk, a German
citizen, three enterprises owned by him, together with all trademark rights to these
enterprises. Thereafter, a sale contract was negotiated in the United States, England, and
Germany, signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland. The contract contained a clause
providing for arbitration of any controversy or claim by the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris. Yet, when a dispute arose, instead of going to arbitration in
accordance with the contract, Alberto-Culver Co. brought suit in American District
Court, alleging that Fritz Scherk violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Supreme Court held securities issues were arbitrable. The Court distinguished Scherk
from Wilko in that Scherk involved a truly international agreement. 104 After referring to
the necessity to maintain predictability in international business transactions, the Court
said that refusing enforcement would "surely damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements." 1 5
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 106 the Supreme Court held that
securities issues could be arbitrated even in a purely domestic arbitration unless it is
contrary to congressional command. However the party who opposing arbitration should
bear the burden to prove that Congress intended to "preclude waiver of judicial remedies
for statutory rights at issue." Moreover, "any such intent will be deducible from statute's
text or legislative history or from inherent conflict between arbitration and statute's
underlying purpose." 107
1 08
Finally, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amencan Express Inc., Wilko was
overruled. The Supreme Court ruled that the holding in Wilko was inconsistent with the
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underlying spirit of FAA favoring arbitration, and securities issues were able to be
arbitrated both internationally and domesticly.
Obviously, American courts adopted a more flexible policy and loosened the
substantive inarbitrability defense in international commercial arbitration. As more and
more statutory claims, such as under RICO 110 and ERISA, 111 are deemed arbitrable, it is
believed that "public policy objections-as criteria independent of statutory law-are not
available to resist the recognition of an international commercial arbitration agreement in
the United States." 112
E. Public Policy and Due Process
Article V(l)(b) of the New York Convention authorizes a court to vacate an award
when "the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case."
113
This clause was also referred to as the "due process" clause
reflecting the basic requirement of procedural fairness in international arbitration. It
should be noted that the procedural requirements contained in the FAA are more rigorous
than the due process clause in the New York Convention. Some defenses, such as fraud,
impartiality of the arbitrators, and corruption, are not explicitly stipulated in the New
York Convention. If the arbitration took place in the United States, those defenses are
available to a party who asks the American court to set aside an arbitral award.
However, if a party were seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, would these
109 Mat 482.
110
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defenses constitute a violation of the American public policy and thus block enforcement
of the awards?
a. Fraud
The following cases deal with the question whether the existence of fraud constitutes
violation of American public policy.
In Indocomex Fibres Pte., Ltd. v. Cotton Company International, Inc., 115 Indocomex
Fibres, an American company, contracted to sell raw cotton to a British buyer. The
American seller did not ship the cotton, alleging that the British buyer's letter of credit
was deficient. The buyer claimed breach of contract, and the dispute was submitted to the
arbitrators of the Liverpool Cotton Association in the United Kingdom. The arbitrators
rendered an award in favor of the British buyer. The buyer then filed a petition with the
American District Court requesting that the award be recognized and enforced. The
American seller responded that the buyer committed fraud by presenting a deficient letter
of credit. The alleged deficiencies included omission of delivery destination and
inadequate repayment guarantees. The court held:
"It is unnecessary for the Court to detail defendant' s specific allegations of fraud
committed by plaintiff because defendant's allegations involve the merits of the
contractual dispute and as such are issues not properly before this court. A court will not
reconsider the merits of the breach of contract dispute which is subject to arbitration." 116
The court further stated that fraud under the FAA "required a showing of bad faith
during the arbitration proceedings, such as bribery, undisclosed bias of the arbitrator, or
willfully destroying evidence, and further required that such evidence of fraud was
unavailable to the arbitrator during the course of the proceeding.""
7 The seller did not
allege that plaintiff concealed information from the arbitrator, that the arbitrator was not
115
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privy to relevant information, that proceedings were suspect in any way, or that evidence
of fraud was discovered only after the arbitration proceedings. The seller merely claimed
that the arbitrators' decision was faulty. Such an objection could not constitute fraud
under the FAA. In other words, the fraud allegations would have to relate to the
arbitration process itself and not to the merits of the claim being arbitrated.
In another case involving fraud, Biotronic Mess-und Therapiergeraete, GmbH & Co.,
v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 118 there was a series of three contracts concluded
between a German manufacturer and an American distributor. A dispute arose, that was
followed by arbitration. The American distributor chose not to attend the hearing in
Switzerland, although the distributor was fully aware the hearing was taking place. The
German manufacturer obtained an award and sough enforcement in an American District
Court. The American distributor alleged that the German company procured the award by
fraud because the German company only submitted two of the three contracts to the
arbitrators. Those two contracts favored the German company's case. The arbitrators
never saw the third contract which favored the American company' s case. The American
company argued this was fraud in violation of public policy. The German company
responded by arguing that in an adversarial system of justice, the failure of one side to
prove the other side' s case can not constitute fraud. The federal court agreed with the
German manufacturer, holding that a party can not complain about the non-production of
evidence when the complaining party had the opportunity to produce the evidence but
failed to do so. The court further stated that there was not sufficient evidence to support a
finding of fraud, and the award should be enforced.
The above mentioned cases indicate that fraud refers only to some irregularity in the
arbitration process. However, the courts have implied that once the existence of fraud is
proved the enforcement could be denied on the ground of a public policy violation.
118
See Biotronic Mess-und Therapiergeraete, GmbH & Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (1976).
37
b. Corruption
Corruption is a serious procedural irregularity. However, in a recent case, AAOT
Foreign Economic Association (VO) Technostroyexport (Techno) v. International
Development and Trade Services, Inc. (IDTS), 119 an American federal court enforced an
award even though the party contended that the award was rendered by a corrupt foreign
tribunal. The case involved a series of purchase contracts between Techno and IDTS.
After disputes arose over IDTS's performance under the contracts, both parties went to
arbitration before the International Court of Commerce and Industry of the Russian
Federation in Moscow. Following the initiation of the arbitration, Sicular, an IDTS
interpreter, approached the secretary of the arbitration court, and inquired about the
possibility of bribing the court.
120
Both the secretary and his superior firmly responded
that they could assist IDTS "sort out" the arbitration in exchange for one million dollars.
The intended bribe ended inconclusively after a series of communications with the
secretary over the next two months, during which time Sicular ostensibly sought to gather
further evidence and establish that the arbitration court and its officials were corrupt.
Finally, the tribunal rendered an award in favor of Techno for approximately $200
million. Techno filed a petition in the district court to confirm the award under the New
York Convention. IDTS alleged the enforcement of the award rendered by a corrupt
foreign tribunal was contrary to the public policy of the United States. The court
determined that IDTS had knowledge of facts indicating the tribunal was corrupt prior to
commencement of the arbitration hearing, and yet IDTS remained silent until an adverse
119
See AAOT Foreign Economic Association (VO) Technostroyexport v. International Development and
Trade Services, Inc., 139 F. 3d 980 (1998).
According to IDTS' s testimony, Sicular acted on her own intiative and to test the integrity of the court.
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award was rendered. Such inaction was considered equal to 1DTS waiving its right to
assert public policy exception as a basis for rejecting the arbitration award. 122
c. Duress
In Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monorovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A. G., the issue
was whether duress constituted violation of the public policy of the United States. Marc
Rich, the party opposing enforcement, argued that, because its opponent had secured a
new agreement with Marc Rich by refusing to comply with the original agreement until a
new one was negotiated, the new agreement has been secured by duress. " The court
stated that "duress is not present unless a party is so overborne that it loses its options."
The court found that Marc Rich did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the existence
of duress. However, the court ruled that "agreements, exacted by duress contravene the
public policy of the nation...and accordingly duress, if established, furnishes a basis for
refusing enforcement of an award under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention." 126
d. Prior Relationship with the Arbitrators
1 97
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., involving a
domestic arbitration, the arbitrator failed to disclose that, at an earlier time, he had been
engaged and paid as a consultant for the party who appointed him. Although no actual
bias existed, the court vacated the award and held that "any tribunal permitted by law to
try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the
appearance of bias."
However, American courts were reluctant to strike down an arbitral award only for
some prior relationship between the parties and the arbitrators in international
122
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123 See Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monorovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A. G., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S. D. N. Y.
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commercial arbitration. In Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., an
arbitrator failed to disclose that he had served on two occasions as counsel for the
prevailing party in other arbitration. Relying on Commonwealth, the losing party asked
for the award to be set aside, arguing that the arbitrator' s non-disclosure was contrary to
the public policy of the United States. The court rejected the contention and said that
"public policy defense should be narrowly construed" and "awards should not be vacated
only because of an appearance of bias."
F. Content of Arbitral Award and Public Policy
Usually, the judicial review of foreign arbitral awards is limited to the arbitration
procedure. However, national courts may utilize the public policy exception to review the
content of awards.
a. Manifest Disregard of Law
In the United States, the opposing party occasionally alleges manifest disregard of
law as the defense against enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Since the New York
Convention does not expressly provide for such defense, the question is whether manifest
disregard of law by arbitrators is contrary to the public policy of the United States.
In Sidarma Societa Italiana di Armamento SPA v. Holt Marine Industries, 130 the
court said that "to vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of law there must be
something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the
arbitrators to understand or apply the law." The court's holding implied that under certain
circumstances manifest disregard of law may be contrary to the public policy of the
United States.
128
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However, in the United States, an arbitrator is not required to give reasons in his
award.
131
This practice is also accepted by many other countries in international
commercial arbitration. Lack of reasons in foreign awards makes it difficult for courts to
determine whether arbitrators misinterpreted the law. Moreover, it has been suggested
that American courts "should not attempt to apply the manifest disregard test when the
governing law of the arbitral dispute is foreign because the difficulty of determining a
manifest disregard of the law in the context of a foreign legal issue. . .makes application
1 ^7 •
of a nonstatutory ground undesirable." ' In fact, the American courts have limited
application of manifest disregard test to extreme circumstances such as when arbitrators
intentionally ignore the applicable law.
133
Thus, it seems unlikely that the losing party
will succeed in blocking enforcement of foreign arbitral award by alleging manifest
disregard of law as a violation of public policy of the United States. In Brandeis Intsel
Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 134 one federal court openly abandoned the manifest
disregard test. After reiterating that the public policy exception should be construed
narrowly, the court said that the manifest disregard defense was not available under
Article V of the New York Convention to a party seeking to vacate an award of foreign
arbitrators based on foreign law. 1 5
131
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b. Punitive Damages
In the United States, punitive damages traditionally are not allowed in contract cases
unless there was malicious conduct in addition to a contract breach.
136 Given that most
international arbitration involves contractual disputes, would it be contrary to the public
policy of the United States if arbitrators awarded punitive damages in accordance with
the governing law? In an early American case, Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens,
S.A. [LTCL] v. Southwire, 1 7 one court's answer was yes. Laminoirs involved a purchase
agreement for steel wire between an American company and a French firm. The contract
provided that the laws of Georgia governed the contract to the extent that they did not
conflict with the laws of France. " After a dispute arose over the pnce to be paid by
Southwire, both parties went to arbitration. Relying on French law, the arbitral tribunal
rendered an award in favor of LTCL, requiring Southwire to pay interest for the unpaid
sum at the legal rate of nine and one half percent to ten and one half percent, plus an
additional five percent per annum for damages to be levied two months after the award
was issued. When an American federal court was called on to enforce the award,
Southwire contended that the rates were usurious, and enforcement was contrary to the
public policy of the state of Georgia. The court upheld the awarded interest rate even
though the rate was higher than what Georgia law generally allowed. However, the court
found that the additional five percent interest would be unacceptable under American and
Georgia case law since it had no reasonable relation to actual damages and therefore
constituted a penalty. Citing Article V(2)(b), the court struck down the additional five
percent interest award. The decision in Laminoirs has been criticized since it seems to
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"ignore the idea of an international public policy, which prohibits the automatic extension
of domestic principles to international arbitration."
140
In the United States, recent debates on awarding punitive damages in international
commercial arbitration focused on whether arbitrators have authority to award punitive
damages. 141 Some legal scholars believe that arbitrators may not award punitive damages
absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement authorizing this relief. Others
believe that arbitrators may award punitive damages unless the parties expressly prohibit
the award of this relief in the arbitration agreement. 142 In Willoughby Roofing & Supply
Co. v. Kajima International, Inc., 143 the Eleventh Circuit Court held, "there is no public
policy bar which prevents arbitrators from considering claims for punitive damages."
Now it is a safe assumption to conclude that if awarding punitive damages is within the
authority of arbitrators and in accordance with the governing law it will not be contrary to
the public policy of the United States.
G. Summary
The above-mentioned cases indicate that American courts have rarely struck down
foreign arbitral awards or arbitration agreements on the ground of public policy
violations. In fact, it is believed that public policy can only be invoked to vacate an award
in theory.
145 On the outside, the reason is that American courts usually distinguished
international public policy from domestic public policy and give the former a more
narrow construction. As the Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. said, a truly
international agreement involved considerations and policies significantly different from
140
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those controlling in a domestic contract.
146
The Court's holding greatly relied on the
international character of the contract and implied that a concept of international public
policy, narrower in scope than the domestic policy, must prevail in international
transactions.
One commentator has observed that international public policy is a type of balancing
interests test, under which national courts should consider not only their own domestic
public policy but also the public policy of interested nations and the needs of
international commerce.
14
In fact, American courts constantly state the following reasons
to support a narrow reading of public policy in international commercial arbitration.
First, the courts should respect party autonomy. Concerning enforcement of an
arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court noted that where an agreement was negotiated
and made "by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, [then] absent some compelling
and countervailing reason... [the agreement]... should be honored by the parties and
enforced by the courts." 148 Concerning enforcement of an arbitral award, the Supreme
Court in Parsons found that when the parties agree to submit disputes to arbitration they
relinquish their legal right to judicial remedy and should bear the risk inherent in
arbitration.
149
Thus, the party is generally estopped from opposing the enforcement of the
award on public policy grounds except in extreme circumstances.
Second, when the court narrowly reads the public policy exception, it respects the
notion of comity. This theme is reflected in the court's holding in Mitsubishi which
emphasized "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
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transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system
for predictability in the resolution of disputes."
150
Third, the needs of international commerce also require a narrow construction of the
public policy exception. In the Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, deciding to enforce a choice
of forum clause, the Court said that "the expansion of American business and industry
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . .We can not
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
Fourth, American courts usually highlight the underlying spirit of the New York
Convention and strictly adhere to the pro-enforcement philosophy. A broad reading of
public policy will frustrate the goal to establish a uniform standard to enforce arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra note 98, at 629.
CHAPTER V
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A. Overview of Arbitration Practice in China before Acceding to the New York
Convention
Before acceding to the New York Convention, China had two arbitration systems: the
domestic arbitration system and the foreign-related arbitration system.
151
Domestic
arbitration in China was not normal arbitration but a mixture of arbitration, government
administration and litigation. 152 The domestic arbitration commissions were actually
government agencies and the arbitrators were government officers. When one party
applied for arbitration, the other party was obliged to respond. Moreover, the arbitration
award was not final since if one party was not satisfied with the award, he might make a
request to the Chinese court for a final judgement on the dispute through the litigation
process.
154
This kind of Chinese domestic arbitration was the product of the system of
state planned economy. However, in contrast to domestic arbitration, China had adopted a
more flexible approach to international commercial arbitration. The foreign arbitral
awards were deemed final and would be enforced by the People's Courts, although China
had long been without domestic laws and regulations governing the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. As Mr. Ren Jianxin, who was the President of the Supreme
People' s Court, said in 1981, that "the enforcement [of foreign arbitral awards] is in fact
151
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fully secured so long as [the awards] are fair and not in violation of the Chinese laws and
policies."
155 However, the conditions for enforcement were quite stringent. The
requirements of fairness and non-violation of Chinese laws and public policies made it
difficult to succeed in seeking enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in China. An even
more serious problem is that absent relevant laws there were no guidelines or procedures
for Chinese courts to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
B. China's Acceding to the New York Convention and Implementing Laws and
Regulations
The impetus for China to adoption of the New York Convention was economic
considerations. After the Chinese government adopted an "open door" policy, China
became an attractive place for foreign investors because of its cheap labor and abundant
natural resources.
6 When disputes arose, foreign investors usually favored international
commercial arbitration. However, the absence of an effective legal regime for
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards deterred foreign investors from investing their
money in China. Thus, it was necessary for China to create a favorable climate for
foreign investors. As then Premier Zhao Ziyang explained to the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress, "The ratification of the Convention. . .is aimed at
meeting the demands of implementing the policy of opening China to economic
cooperation with foreign countries and facilitating the country's foreign trade." 157
On December 6, 1986, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
1 SR
adopted a decision declaring that China would accede to the New York Convention. In
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order to assure implementation of the New York Convention in practice, the Supreme
People's Court issued a Notice on the Implementation of China's Accession to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to higher
and intermediate level courts.
159
With respect to jurisdiction, the Notice provided that
Intermediate People's Court should assume the jurisdiction over the disputes involving
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
160
Moreover, the Notice specifically addressed
that in determining whether enforcement should be granted the court should look to
Article V of the New York Convention. If no exceptions are present, the court must
enforce the award in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.
On August 31, 1994, China promulgated its first arbitration law which governs both
domestic and international arbitration. 16" The main purposes of the Chinese Arbitration
Law were to bring about a fundamental reform of the Chinese domestic arbitration
system and to strengthen the foreign-related arbitration regime in China. Thus, the
Chinese Arbitration Law set forth a basic legal framework for the development of
arbitration in China. The principles contained in Chinese Arbitration Law, such as
contractual freedom and different treatment of domestic arbitration and international
arbitration, indicate that China is attempting to integrate its arbitration system at the
international level.
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C. Judicial Application of the Public Policy Exception in China
In China, the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards is governed
by the Chinese Arbitration Law, the Code of Civil Procedure and the New York
Convention.
a. Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
According to Chinese Arbitration Law, an arbitration agreement shall be void if the
agreed matters for arbitration exceed the range of arbitration matters as specified by law.
In contrast to its United States counterpart, the Chinese law on arbitrablility is based upon
express provisions of law. Article 2 and Article 3 of the Chinese Arbitration Law
explicitly deal with the problem of arbitrability. Article 2 provide that contractual
disputes and other disputes over rights and interests in property between citizens, legal
persons and other organizations that are equal subjects may be arbitrated. 16 Article 3
specifies some disputes that may not be arbitrated. Those disputes include marital
disputes, adoption, guardianship, support, succession disputes and administrative disputes
that laws require to be handled by administrative authorities. 164 The language in Article 2
is similar to that of Article 2 of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), which
defines the subject matters regulated by GPCL. 165 Article 2 of GPCL provides that GPCL
regulates property and personal relationships between citizens, legal persons and other
organizations that are equal subjects. The only difference between those two Articles is
that Article 2 of Chinese Arbitration Law does not refer to personal relationships. In fact,
Article 3 provides that some personal relationships are not arbitrable. 166 Most Chinese
legal scholars believe that personal relationships could not be arbitrated because of public
163
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policy consideration.
167
Nevertheless, the language in Article 2 is quite abstract so that
any business dispute can be arbitrated if it does not fall into Article 3. In fact, special
laws, which are designed to regulate a particular area of the Chinese economy, generally
provide for arbitration as the means of alternative dispute resolution. For example, Article
79 of Provisional Regulation on Issue and Purchase of Stocks provides that any dispute
arising from issue or purchase of stocks can be referred to arbitration. The similar
provision can also be found in Copyright Law and Technology Contract Law, which had
been deemed non-arbitrable under the American law. In China, so many subject matters
can be arbitrated that the court rarely resorts to public policy in deciding whether subject
matters can be arbitrated.
However, in a recent case, Shanghai Far East Aero-Technology Import & Export
Corporation (SFAIC) v. Revpower Limited, 168 the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in spite of the arbitration agreement between the
parties. The case involved a contract under which SFAIC and Revpower cooperated to
produce industrial batteries in Shanghai. The contract contained an arbitration clause
providing that the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce would
arbitrate all disputes arising from the contract. When SFAIC breached the contract,
Revpower brought the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the contract. At first,
SFAIC participated in the arbitration and submitted its defense and counterclaims.
However, before the tribunal rendered its award, SFAIC withdrew from the arbitration
and initiated court proceeding before Shanghai Intermediate People's Court. Shanghai
Intermediate People's Court assumed jurisdiction over the same dispute and said that,
since the dispute involved fraud, allowing arbitration was contrary to Chinese public
167
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policy.
169
Finally, the tribunal rendered an award against SFAIC for $6 million plus
interest. When Revpower sought enforcement of the award before the Shanghai
Intermediate People's Court, the court refused to dismiss SFAIC s claims. However,
under the pressures from Supreme People's Court and various American governmental
agencies, Shanghai Intermediate People's Court finally dismissed the case and admitted
the finality of the arbitral award. In this case, the legal issue was quite simple. If the fraud
occurred during the contractual negotiation, it may have affected the validity of the
arbitration agreement. If the fraud occurred in the performance of the contract, the
dispute was still within the scope of an ordinary business dispute, which could be
arbitrated under Chinese law. There were no violations of Chinese public policy in any
way. Nevertheless, the Shanghai Intermediate People's Court spent almost two years on
this case. The Revpower case has caused some negative effects on international
commercial arbitration in China. Revpower had appealed to the Trade Representative of
the United States requiring the United States to impede China from participating in the
WTO, because the Chinese government failed to undertake its obligations under the New
York Convention. 170 Obviously, if Chinese courts arbitrarily invoked public policy to
vacate arbitration agreements, foreign investors would lose their confidence in the
Chinese arbitration system.
b. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Prior to enactment of the Chinese Arbitration Law, the application of the New York
Convention in appropriate cases was required under Article 260 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Article 260 authorized the People's Court to refuse enforcement of a foreign
aribtral award if the party furnished evidence that:
(1) There was no arbitration clause in the contract or the parties did not reach an
arbitration agreement after a dispute arose;
169 Mat 309.
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(2) The parties against whom the award was invoked were not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or were otherwise
unable to present his case not for his own reason;
(3) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the arbitration rules selected by the parties;
(4) The award dealt with a difference not failing within the scope of the arbitration
agreement, or it contained decisions on matters that could not be arbitrated under the law.
Moreover, if the People's Court determined that the enforcement of the foreign
arbitral award was contrary to the public interest of the People's Republic of China, the
enforcement should be refused. 171
Article 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure closely resembles Article V of the New
York Convention. Both recognize public policy as a defense against enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.
However, it is confusing that the Chinese Arbitration Law does not contain the
public policy exception to block enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Article 70 and
Article 71 of the Chinese Arbitration Law provide that the People's Court can set aside or
refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if the party proves that:
(1) The parties neither included an arbitration clause in their contract nor
subsequently concluded a written arbitration agreement;
(2) The party against whom the enforcement is sought was not notified to appoint an
arbitrator or to take part in the arbitration proceedings or the party against whom the
enforcement is sought was unable to state his opinions due to reasons for which he is not
responsible;
(3) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure was not in
conformity with the rules of arbitration; or
170
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(4) The matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or
are beyond the authority of the arbitration institution.
Since the Chinese Arbitration Law was enacted after the Code of Civil Procedure, it
should preempt relevant provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. 17 However, Chinese
Arbitration Law does not provide for the public policy exception, would it still be an
available defense for the party who opposes the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award?
According to Article 142 of GPCL, 173 if there is a discrepancy between Chinese law and
the international treaty to which China is a party, the treaty shall be applied. Since China
is a signatory to the New York Convention which recognizes the public policy exception,
the generally accepted answer is that under the New York Convention the public policy
exception is available for the party who opposes enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
in China.
Public policy is an ambiguous concept and its application depends on judicial
interpretation. Lack of reported cases makes it difficult to systematically analyze how
Chinese courts apply public policy exception in practice. Nevertheless, in a few reported
cases, the results are quite frustrating. In those cases, Chinese courts construed Chinese
public policy broadly and sometimes incorrectly invoked the public policy exception to
block enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
In Bailing (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Zhanjiang Yancheng Industrial Ltd Co., 17 the
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award on the
ground of a public policy violation. The case involved a joint venture contract between
Yancheng and Bailing. After a dispute arose, Bailing initiated arbitration before the China
171
See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONGFA, supra note 35, Article 260
1
In China, if there are contradict provisions between two laws, the law, which is enacted lately, should
preempt the previous law. However, the condition is that both law at the same level (the laws have been
divided into three levels: constitution, basic law and local law).
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International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Shenzhen Sub-Commission
(CIETAC). Since the case involved an enormous amount of money, the arbitration fee
should have been about $214040 according to the arbitration rule. However, Bailing was
in serious financial trouble at that time and was unable to pay such an amount of money.
Upon request of Bailing, the Secretariat of CIETAC agreed to reduce the arbitration fee to
$180000. The tribunal rendered an award against Yancheng, and thereafter Bailing
instituted a court proceeding before the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court seeking
enforcement of the award. However, the court said that Article 76 of the Chinese
Arbitration Law required parties to pay arbitration fees required by regulations. It
violated mandatory provision of the Chinese Arbitration Law that Bailing did not pay the
full arbitration fees, so enforcement of the award would be contrary to public interest of
China.
175
The court erred in two ways in reaching the holding. First, it did not analyze
whether Article 76 was a mandatory provision. Second, even if Article 76 was a
mandatory provision, the court would still have to analyze whether Article 76 was
designed to protect general interest of society. Only if both of those conditions were
satisfied, could the court consider to refuse to enforce the award on the ground of public
policy violation. The court's holding in Yancheng has been criticized by most Chinese
legal scholars and practitioners. 17 It has been thought of as a result of interference from
local government. Since Yancheng was the biggest local state-owned enterprise, and it
would have faced bankruptcy if the arbitral award had been enforced. In order to protect
the local interest, local government imposed great pressures on the court, and finally, the
court made "a policy decision." 177
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Shenzhen Sub-Commission) (1995), at 209.
175
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In another case, Ju Ren (Hong Kong) Ltd Corp. v. Haizhongbao Ltd Corp., the
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award on the
grounds of a public policy violation. The case involved a purchase contract between
Haizhongbao and Ju Ren. Under the contract, Haizhongbao agreed to sell Ju Ren thirty
tons of yellow-fin tuna. After Haizhongbao delivered the first ten tons of yellow-fin
tunas, Ju Ren found the tuna delivered did not meet the standard of quality provided by
the contract. Ju Ren refused to accept the remaining twenty tons of yellow-fin tuna.
Haizhongbao commenced arbitration before CIETAC. At the same time, in order to
collect evidence for the arbitration, Haizhongbao applied for interim relief before
Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court, seeking sequestration of one sample tuna from
the delivered tuna. Ju Ren participated in arbitration and raised counterclaims. After the
first hearing, the tribunal issued a procedural award, and decided to retain an expert to
appraise whether the sample tuna sequestrated by Guangzhou Intermediate People's
Court met the quality requirement under the contract. Thereafter, Ju Ren itself also
submitted one tuna to tribunal and claimed that it was the same as those already
delivered. The expert issued two reports. The first report was based on the sample tuna
sequestrated by the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court, the second report was based
on the tuna submitted by Ju Ren. However, the results of two reports were same. Relying
on both reports, the tribunal rendered an award against Haizhongbao. Then Ju Ren sought
enforcement of the award before the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court. The court
refused to enforce the award on the ground of public policy exception. The court said the
procedural award only required appraisal of the sample tuna sequestrated by the
Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court. Therefore, it infringed Haizhongbao's
procedural right where the tribunal accepted the second report. The court held that
enforcement would violate Chinese public policy. In its holding, the court did not explain
178
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what kinds of procedural rights under Chinese laws had been infringed and whether the
infringement constituted a violation of public policy if it existed.
Noticing problems arising from capricious use of the public policy exception by
local courts, China has established an internal system by which enforcement actions
involving foreign arbitral awards are monitored. In its Notice on Handling Awards
Involving Foreign Interest and Foreign Arbitral Awards, issued in August 1995, the
Supreme People's Court required any People's Court to first receive approval from the
superior people's court in the same jurisdiction before refusing enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award. Furthermore, any superior court that decides to uphold a People's Court
refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award must, in turn, report its decision to the Supreme
People's Court prior to finalizing the decision to refuse enforcement.
17
To some extent,
the Notice effectively prevents local courts from arbitrarily invoking public policy
exception to vacate foreign arbitral awards. In 1997, of fifteen cases, ten were recognized
and enforced, only four were denied for procedural irregularities as specified by the New
York Convention. None of these decisions were based on the public policy exception. 18C
According to the text of the law, arbitration practice in China and the underlying
spirit of the New York Convention, Chinese court should narrowly construed public
policy exception.
First, China has traditionally distinguished international arbitration and domestic
arbitration. In contrast to international arbitration, judicial review of domestic arbitration
is more stringent. In domestic arbitration, the scope of judicial review includes not only
the procedural matters but also the merits of the award. For example, under Article 58
and Article 63 of the Chinese Arbitration Law, the court may set aside or refuse to
enforce a domestic arbitral award if it finds that the main evidence for ascertaining the
179
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facts is insufficient, or the application of law was truly incorrect. However, under
Article 70, which governs enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it is generally accepted
that the judicial review of foreign arbitral awards should be limited to procedural matters.
Thus, the Chinese Arbitration Law itself indicates that a more flexible standard should be
adopted in international commercial arbitration.
Second, Article 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a foreign judgment
is not enforceable if it violates basic principles of Chinese law or sovereignty, national
security or public interest. The concept of public interest has been used in contrast to the
concept of basic principles of Chinese law. Thus, it seems that the scope of the two
concepts are not identical and public interest may be more narrow than basic principles of
1 8?
Chinese law. " However, even if China stated that the foreign arbitral awards must not
violate basic principles of Chinese laws, a narrow reading of the public policy exception
should still apply since not every violation of specific provisions of law constitutes a
JOT
violation of the basic principles of Chinese law.
Third, since China acceded to the New York Convention, the Convention itself has
become the source of law in China. When the court is called on to enforce a foreign
arbitral award, it must consider the underlying spirit of the New York Convention.
Fourth, the impetus for China to join the New York Convention was to facilitate its
foreign trade. However, as one commentator has said that if the Chinese government
hopes to increase investor confidence it is important that the public policy exception is
"not too broadly defined." 184
However, there are still two problems in the present Chinese legal regime for
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards that must be resolved by Chinese legislators.
China International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Research Institute) (1998).
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First, the courts must be prevented from refusing enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award only because of protecting local interests. As in the Bailing,
185
when the courts can
not find other reasons specified by the laws, they usually resort to the public policy
exception as the last recourse if the enforcement will jeopardize the local interests.
Although the 1995 Notice has, to some extent, foreclosed arbitrarily invoking the public
policy exception by local courts, it is merely an internal notice and not a law. 186 Strictly
speaking, it is not legally binding on junior courts.
Second, if the court refuse to enforce the arbitral award, the decision is final and can
not be appealed. Since in China only Intermediate People's Courts have jurisdiction over
the disputes involving enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the senior courts, including
the Supreme People's Court, are in fact foreclosed from interpreting public policy issues.
It will impede China from developing a uniform and consistent application of the public
policy exception injudicial practice.
D. Judicial Application of Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong
In 1997, China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong and adopted the policy of "one
country, two systems". As for its legal system, Hong Kong maintains a common law
tradition. Prior to 1997, in Hong Kong, enforcement of arbitral awards created in other
jurisdictions, including the Mainland, was governed by the New York Convention. After
reunification, the New York Convention continues to apply to international arbitral
awards. However, the New York Convention is an international agreement, and it no
longer applies to the enforcement of arbitral awards between the Mainland and Hong
Kong. In August 1999, the Mainland and Hong Kong reached an agreement to set up a
new enforcement mechanism. Under the new arrangement, the court shall adopt the same
standards as Article V of the New York Convention to review arbitral awards made in the
Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards, 3 J. Chinese L. 117, 142.
185
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Mainland or Hong Kong. Moreover, the new arrangement also contains the public policy
exception. The enforcement of the award may be refused if the court in the Mainland
holds that the enforcement is contrary to the public interests of the Mainland. Likewise, if
a court in Hong Kong rules that the enforcement is contrary to the public policy of Hong
Kong.
Like other common law countries, the courts in Hong Kong narrowly read the public
policy exception. In Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd., the court refused
to enforce a CIETAC arbitral award. The tribunal rendered an award based on an
expert report. However, the tribunal did not give the parties an opportunity to examine the
report. The court held that the procedural irregularities were so serious that enforcement
should be refused. Concerning Klockner's public policy defense, the court said if the
defendant could not prove that he was absolutely unable to present his case, the court
would not consider public policy issues. After citing Parsons, 188 the court further stated
that the public policy defense should be narrowly construed. Finally, the court said that
the case did not involve public policy issues.
In another case, Zhejiang Province Garment Import and Export Co. v. Siemssen &
Co (Hong Kong) Trading Ltd., 189 the court rejected the defendant's public policy defense.
The case involved enforcement of a CIETAC arbitral award that required the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff for a certain amount of tariff paid to Chinese customs by
plaintiff. The defendant contended that enforcement of the award was contrary to the
public policy of Hong Kong since it was equal to requiring the defendant to pay taxes to a
foreign country. The court noted that a part of the tariff could be refunded from Chinese
customs if the defendant performed its obligation under the contract. Since the defendant
supra note 179.
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totally repudiated his contractual obligation, the plaintiff could not collect the money
from Chinese customs. The purpose of the award was to require the defendant to
compensate the plaintiff s loss. So, it did not concern public policy issues.
From 1989 to 1994, about sixty cases involved enforcement of CIETAC arbital
awards in Hong Kong, and except for Paklito, all have been enforced by the courts. 19 '
190
See TAO CHUNMING & WANG SHENGCHANG, ZHONGGUO GUOJI JINGJI MAOYI
ZHONGCAI-CHENGXU LILUN YU SHIWU (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration-
Procedural Theory and Practice) (1996), at 84-85.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION-THE POSSIBILITY OF REMOVING THE PUBLIC POLICY
DEFENSE FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Until now, the public policy exception has not been a major obstacle to the
development of international commercial arbitration. However, the risks of the public
policy exception are self-evident. The flexible interpretation of the concept has been
deemed as an invitation to legal anarchy. In fact, every country could pursue its own
policies and disregard the notion of community interests or the interests of other
countries.
191
This flexibility jeopardizes the effectiveness of international commercial
arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. At least one commentator has
1 0?
suggested removing the public policy exception from the New York Convention,
leaving the party who believes the award is unjust to invoke the remaining provisions of
the New York Convention. The losing party could also ask for the award to be set aside in
the country where it was rendered. However, it must be noted that the purpose of the
public policy exception is not only to maintain fairness of arbitration but also to provide
for a means by which individual nations can protect the integrity of their national legal
systems. That is why the New York Convention authorizes the national court to invoke
the public policy exception on its own motion. It has been stated that no country will risk
opening its legal system to foreign or private jurisdictions. 193 If this notion is still upheld
by most countries, and enforcement of arbitration agreements or arbitral awards is still
191
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dependent on national courts, it seems that it is not the time to remove the public policy
exception from the New York Convention.
Generally speaking, the public policy exception may cause two major problems in
international commercial arbitration: jeopardizing the finality of arbitral awards and
uniformity ofjudicial review by national courts.
First, under what circumstances can national courts invoke the public policy
exception to vacate arbitration agreements and arbitral awards? In contrast to other
defenses under Article V of the New York Convention, only the public policy exception
is dependent on judicial interpretation of national courts. If national courts read the public
policy exception broadly when called on to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitral
awards, it will jeopardize the finality of arbitral awards. Most countries, like the United
States, limit application of the public policy exception to extreme cases, where
enforcement will be contrary to the basic notions of morality and justice of the forum.
Thus, to some extent, the finality of the award can be assured.
Second, even though most countries narrowly read the public policy exception or
recognize international public policy, the problem of uniformity still exists since
international public policy belongs to the domestic legal regime, and may has different
scope in different countries. Thus, some legal scholars advocate the concept of
transnational public policy, which can unify the standards of national judicial review at
the international level.
194
The tendency to narrowly read the public policy exception
provides a favorable circumstance under which a truly transnational public policy could
develop. Once a transnational public policy has been formed, the public policy exception
will no longer be an uncertained factor in international arbitration.
However, recent trends in international commercial arbitration, such as the
derealization movement, may cause some trouble in the future. Derealization generally
194
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refers to "the emerging state practice of lifting domestic restrains to purely international
arbitration."
195
Under the delocalized approach to international commercial arbitration,
the laws of the nation where the award is rendered should not interfere with the process
by allowing judicial review of either the arbitration agreement or award. For example, in
Belgium, the law forbids judicial intervention in international arbitration that occurred in
Belgium no matter how the arbitration was conducted. 196 So, the losing party has no
recourse until the award is moved to the enforcement stage. Professor Park has observed
that the trend is to shift the control function from the arbitral situs to the execution
forum.
197
However, when the laws of the nation where arbitration occurred loosen control
on international arbitration, what are the reactions of the enforcing nation? The enforcing
nation would most likely resort to the public policy exception to prevent unfairness and
return to a hostile relationship with arbitration.
Moreover, coupled with this derealization movement, more and more countries
allow international arbitrators to decide on public-law issues. In the United States, the
non-arbitrability defense is almost unavailable for the parties. Professor Carbonneau has
stated, "The widening of arbitration's mission in international commerce to include
regulatory law conflicts is a hazardous enterprise." In fact, as more public law issues
are deemed arbitrable, national courts are more likely to interfere with arbitration on the
grounds of public policy violations. As the court in Mitsubishi warned, if arbitrators
incorrectly apply American antitrust law, the court will invoke public policy exception to
vacate the resulting award. Therefore, "judicial review of the contents of awards, at least
195
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for their conformity with public policy, is the cost for letting the statutory claims go to
arbitration."
Professor Enterria has proposed to introduce interest analysis into international
commercial arbitration to limit the application of the public policy exception. ° The
basic idea is that the national court may invoke the public policy exception only when
there is a strong relationship between the forum and the underlying transaction. 201
However, interest analysis has limited functions in international arbitration. Since the
party usually seeks enforcement of an award in a country where the losing party has
assets, the presence of assets is sufficient to establish a connection between the
transaction and the forum. Thus, it seems that generating a truly transnational public
policy is the best way to deal with the problems caused by the public policy exception in
international commercial arbitration. Given time, international society may accept a well-
defined transnational public policy which will make international arbitration more
effective and more predictable. However, since every country's legal system differs, it
may take a long time to develop internationally accepted and fundamental principles of
public policy.
See William W. Park, supra note 91.
See Enterria, supra note 2, at 406.
201
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